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Abstract
The logic of reason-based preference advanced in Osherson and Weinstein (2012) is ex-
tended to quantifiers. Basic properties of the new system are discussed.
1 Introduction
In Osherson and Weinstein (2012) we proposed a logic with binary modal connective X that
can be read informally as follows.
Let formulas ϕ and ψ be given along with a collection X of utility scales that
measure value along various dimensions. Then ϕ X ψ iff the situation that comes
to mind when envisioning ϕ being true is weakly preferred to the situation that
comes to mind when envisioning ψ being true, according to the criteria indexed
by X.
The utility scales can be conceived as “reasons-for-preference.” For example, p might be
dinner tonight with Mitt Romney, and q dinner tonight with Barack Obama. Then if X
consists of the two reasons “enjoy lively conversation,” and “influence policy,” it might be
true of you that q X (p ∧ q). Note that the two reasons cut in different directions: dinner
with both would be more lively but offer less chance to influence policy. Affirming the formula
thus results from aggregating the two considerations. Of course, you might instead have to
evaluate just p X ⊤, that is, whether dinner with Mitt is weakly better than your present
situation (represented by the tautology ⊤).
Other examples are discussed in Osherson and Weinstein (2012), and a formal semantics
for such sentences is presented and analyzed. The system can be seen as a propositional calcu-
lus extended with modal binary connectives. Our present purpose is to show how the propo-
sitional part can be replaced with predicate calculus. It is left to Osherson and Weinstein
∗Contact: osherson@princeton.edu, weinstein@cis.upenn.edu
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(2012) to indicate the previous work that inspired ours, notably, Liu (2008); Dietrich and List
(2009). To get started, we specify the languages under consideration, then turn to semantics.
2 Language
2.1 Signatures
A quantified language is built from its “signature.”
(1) Definition: By a signature is meant a pair (L,U) where
(a) L is a collection of predicates and function symbols of various arities.
(b) U is a nonempty collection of nonempty subsets of natural numbers (0, 1 . . . ).
The numbers appearing in X ∈ U represent specific reasons for preference such as the desire
for lively conversation in our example. A set X of reasons influences preference through ag-
gregation of its members. If
⋃
U ∈ U then preference according to
⋃
U amounts to preference
tout court.
2.2 Formulas
We specify the language L(L,U) parameterized by the signature (L,U). Formulas are built
from the following symbols.
(a) the members of L along with the identity sign =
(b) for each X ∈ U, the binary connective X
(c) the binary connective ∧ and the unary connective ¬
(d) the quantifier ∃
(e) the two parentheses, (, )
(f) a denumerable collection v0, v1 . . . of individual variables (denoted below by x, y, z).
The set of terms is constructed from functions and variables as usual. The set L(L,U) of
formulas is likewise built in the usual way except that we add the clause:
Given ϕ,ψ ∈ L(L,U) and X ∈ U, ϕ X ψ also belongs to L(L,U).
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Moreover, we rely on the following abbreviations.
∀xϕ for ¬∃x¬ϕ
(ϕ ∨ ψ) for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
(ϕ→ ψ) for (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)
(ϕ↔ ψ) for ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ))
(ϕ 1...k ψ) for (ϕ {1...k} ψ)
(ϕ ≻X ψ) for (ϕ X ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ X ϕ)
(ϕ ≈X ψ) for (ϕ X ψ) ∧ (ψ X ϕ)
(ϕ X ψ) for (ψ X ϕ)
(ϕ ≺X ψ) for (ψ ≻X ϕ)
⊤ for ∀x(x = x)
⊥ for ¬⊤
2.3 Examples
The following formulas serve as illustration.
(2) (a) ∃x(Px ≻X ∀yPy)
(b) ∃xPx ≻X ∀yPy
In the domain of people, (2)a affirms that there is someone for whom satisfying P is preferable
to everyone satisfying it. This might well be true. For example, from my perspective, it’s
better that I discover a metric ton of gold than that everyone does (where the reasons encoded
in X are basely materialistic). In contrast, (2)b entails that someone getting the gold is better
than everyone getting it, which might be false if it doesn’t strike me as plausible that I’m the
lucky person.
The next example exhibits modal embedding. Consider the domain of potential automobile
purchases. Let P refer to the purchase of an efficient gasoline car, and Q to the purchase of a
fully electric vehicle. Finally, let the utility indices 1, 2 measure, respectively, ecological value
and financial interest. Then
∀x (Px ≺1 ∃y (Qy ≻2 Px ) )
says that buying an efficient gasoline car is not as ecologically useful as there being an electric
car whose purchase is financially more attractive than buying the gas vehicle. The formula
is true if electricity is ecologically superior to gas but consumer choice is based on narrow
economic interest. We now turn from intuitive meaning to formal semantics.
3
3 Semantics
Recall that a signature (L,U) consists of vocabulary (L) and sets of utility indices (U).
3.1 Models
(3) Definition: Let a signature (L,U) be given. By a model for the signature is meant
a quintuple M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 where:
(a) D is a nonempty set, the domain of M.
(b) W is a nonempty set of points, the worlds of M.
(c) t maps W× L to the appropriate set-theoretic objects over D. (For example, if
Q ∈ L is a binary relation symbol then t(w,Q) is a subset of D ×D.) Identity
is assigned to =.
(d) u is a function from U×W to the real numbers. For X, {i} ∈ U we write uX(w)
in place of u(X,w) and ui(w) in place of u({i}, w).
(e) s is a function from W × {A ⊆ W | ∅ 6= A} such that for all w ∈ W and
∅ 6= A ⊆W , s(w,A) ∈ A.
Thus, W corresponds to a set of potential situations; via t, each gives extensions in D to
the vocabulary in L. The function uX measures the utility of worlds according to the con-
siderations encoded in X ∈ U. Finally, given a world w0 and a set A of worlds, s selects a
“cognitively salient” member of A, where salience may depend on the vantage point w0.
3.2 Propositions
Subsets of worlds are called propositions. In the context of a given model, our semantic
definition assigns a proposition (subset of W) to each formula.
Fix a signature (L,U), and let a model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 be given. By an assignment
(for M) is meant a map of the individual variables of L(L,U) into D. Given a variable x and
assignment d, an x variant of d is any assignment that differs from d at most in the member
of D assigned to x. Assignments are extended to terms of L(L,U) in the usual way.
(4) Definition: Let a model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 and assignment d be given. For ϕ ∈
L(L,U), the proposition ϕ[M, d ] is defined as follows.
(a) If ϕ is Pt1 . . . tn for P ∈ L and terms t1 . . . tn then:
ϕ[M, d ] = {w ∈W | 〈d(t1) . . . d(tn)〉 ∈ t(w,P )}.
(b) If ϕ is the negation ¬θ then ϕ[M, d ] = W \ θ[M, d ].
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(c) If ϕ is the conjunction (θ ∧ ψ) then ϕ[M, d ] = θ[M, d ] ∩ ψ[M, d ].
(d) If ϕ is the existential ∃xψ then ϕ[M, d ] is the set of w ∈ W such that w ∈
ψ[M, d′ ] for some x variant d′ of d.
(e) If ϕ has the form (θ X ψ) for X ∈ U, then ϕ[M, d ] = ∅ if either θ[M, d ] = ∅
or ψ[M, d ] = ∅. Otherwise:
ϕ[M, d ] = {w ∈W | uX(s(w, θ[M, d ])) ≥ uX(s(w,ψ[M, d ]))}.
Thus, relative to M and d, the formula (θ X ψ) expresses the null proposition if evaluating
it requires that s choose a world from ∅. (Preference makes a covert existential claim in
the present theory, namely, that there is something to choose between.) Otherwise w ∈ W
belongs to the proposition expressed by (θ X ψ) just in case the world chosen by s to
represent θ[M, d ] has greater X-utility than the world chosen by s to represent ψ[M, d ] —
where s’s choices depend on the current situation w. Informally, we think of s as choosing
the most similar world to w among those available in the proposition at issue.
We extract the assignment-invariant core of a formula’s proposition in the standard way.
(5) Definition: Let ϕ ∈ L(L,U) and model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 be given. We write
ϕ[M ] for the intersection of ϕ[M, d ] over all assignments d.
It follows that for closed ϕ ∈ L(L,U) (no free variables), ϕ[M ] = ϕ[M, d ] for any assignment
d.
3.3 Global modality
We can express global modality in the sense of Blackburn et al. (2001, §2.1) in the following
way. Choose any X ∈ U, and for ϕ ∈ L(L,U) define:
(6) ϕ
def
= ¬(¬ϕ X ¬ϕ) and ♦ϕ
def
= (ϕ X ϕ).
Then unwinding clause (4)e of our semantic definition yields:
(7) Proposition: For all ϕ ∈ L(L,U), models M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉, and assignments d:
(a) ϕ[M, d ] 6= ∅ iff ϕ[M, d ] = W iff ϕ[M, d ] = W.
(b) ♦ϕ[M, d ] 6= ∅ iff ♦ϕ[M, d ] = W iff ϕ[M, d ] 6= ∅.
As an immediate and more perspicuous corollary, we have:
(8) Corollary: For all closed ϕ ∈ L(L,U), models M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉:
(a) ϕ[M ] 6= ∅ iff ϕ[M ] = W iff ϕ[M ] = W.
(b) ♦ϕ[M ] 6= ∅ iff ♦ϕ[M ] = W iff ϕ[M ] 6= ∅.
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4 Basic properties of quantified preference logic
4.1 Expressive power of modal formulas
It is worth verifying that our modal vocabulary allows additional propositions to be expressed.
(9) Definition:
(a) The modal depth of formulas is defined inductively. First-order (non-modal)
formulas have modal depth zero. If ϕ,ψ ∈ L have respective modal depths m,n
then ϕ X ψ has modal depth 1 +max{m,n}.
(b) We say that a model M has a modal hierarchy just in case there are closed
formulas ϕ0, ϕ1 . . . such that for all n ≥ 0:
(i) ϕn has modal depth n;
(ii) for all closed ψ ∈ L of modal depth n or less, ϕn+1[M ] 6= ψ[M ].
(10) Definition: Let N = 〈D,W, t〉 be the first three components of a model, missing just
the utility and selection functions, u, s. Notice that 〈D,W, t〉 assigns a proposition
ψ[N ] ⊆ W to each non-modal ψ ∈ L. We call N a normal core just in case D
is countable, W is countably infinite, and there is non-modal, closed ψ ∈ L with
∅ 6= ψ[N ] 6= W.
Now fix a countable signature (L,U). The following proposition reveals the near ubiquity
of modal hierarchies.
(11) Proposition: Let N = 〈D,W, t〉 be a normal core. Then there is a utility function
u : U×W→ ℜ and a selection function s : W×{A ⊆W | A 6= ∅} →W such that the
model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 has a modal hierarchy.
Proof: Choose utility index X ∈ U, let N = 〈D,W, t〉 be a normal core, and fix closed,
non-modal ψ ∈ L with ∅ 6= ψ[N ] 6= W. By replacing ψ with its negation if necessary, we
can ensure that ψ[N ] has at least two elements. Let ϕ0 be ψ and let ϕn+1 be (⊤ ≺X ϕn).
Observe that for all n ∈ N , ϕn has modal depth n. We will define s and u in such a way that
ϕ0, ϕ1 . . . is a modal hierarchy for M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉.
Let {w0, w1, . . . } enumerate W. Since ψ[N ] = ϕ0[N ] has at least two elements, we may
assume without loss of generality that {w0, w1} ⊆ ϕ0[N ]. Let u be any utility function that
meets the conditions:
(12) uX(w0) = 0 and for all i > 0, uX(wi) = 1.
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It remains to specify the selection function s, and to show that it generates a modal hierarchy.
This is achieved by inductively defining a sequence of “partial selection” functions sn, n ∈ N .
At stage n, the partial selector sn defines a partial model Mn = 〈D,W, t, u, sn〉 which yields
a proposition χ[Mn, d ] for each assignment d, and each χ ∈ L of modal depth n or below. It
will be easy to see that for each such χ and d, χ[Mn, d ] = χ[M, d ] whereM = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉
with
⋃
n sn ⊂ s. Let Pn denote the family of nonempty propositions expressed by formulas of
modal depth n or below with arbitrary assignments of members of D to their free variables.
It is easy to verify that Pn is countable. At stage n = 0, we let s0 = ∅.
For stage n+ 1, we will define sn+1 so that:
(a) sn+1 is defined for every pair (w,X) where w ∈ W and X ∈ Pn; hence, for every
assignment d and χ ∈ L of modal depth n or below, χ[Mn, d ] is well defined.
(b) ϕn+1[Mn+1 ] 6∈ Pn hence ϕn+1[M ] 6∈ Pn;
Moreover, at every stage n, it will be the case that {w0, w1} ⊆ ϕn[Mn ]. In particular,
{w0, w1} ⊆ ϕ0[M0 ] = ψ[N ] follows from our choice of ψ.
Now we complete stage n+1. For all w ∈W, set sn+1(w,W) = w0 (hence we always draw
w0 from the proposition expressed by ⊤). For all w ∈ W and all C ∈ Pn − {ϕn[Mn ],W},
choose sn+1(w,C) to be an arbitrary member of C. For the remainder of sn+1, choose
A ⊆W− {w0, w1} such that A 6∈ {B − {w0, w1} | B ∈ Pn}. Such an A exists because Pn is
countable. For all w ∈W, we define:
sn+1(w,ϕn[Mn ]) =
{
w1 if w ∈ A ∪ {w0, w1}
w0 otherwise.
It follows immediately from (12) that ϕn+1[Mn+1 ] = A ∪ {w0, w1} 6∈ Pn. ✷
A natural question about Proposition (11) is whether modal hierarchies still appear when
models satisfy various frame properties. To illustrate, model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 is called
“reflexive” just in case for all w ∈ W and A ⊆ W, if w ∈ A then s(w,A) = w. Reflexivity
embodies the idea that the actual world is closer to home than any other world. Several
frame properties are examined in Osherson and Weinstein (2012), and also below. In the
case of reflexivity, the foregoing proof can be adjusted to show that any normal core can be
extended to a reflexive model with modal hierarchy. We leave unexplored the larger project
of characterizing the frame properties that allow modal hierarchies, or identifying natural
properties that do not.
4.2 Undecidability of satisfaction
Suppose that the signature (L,U) contains two unary predicates P,Q ∈ L. Then it follows
from the argument in Kripke (1962) that:
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(13) Proposition: The satisfiable subset of L(L,U) is not decidable.
Kripke’s argument hinges on a mapping from first-order sentences with just the binary relation
symbol R to modal sentences that replace Rxy with ♦(Px ∧ Qy). On the other hand, the
validities are axiomatizable:
(14) Proposition: If the signature is effectively enumerable then so is the set of valid
formulas in quantified preference logic.
This fact follows from Proposition (19), below.
4.3 Size of models
Suppose that the signature contains a binary predicate G. Then the upward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem property fails to apply to quantified preference logic. Indeed:
(15) Proposition: There is ϕ ∈ L(L,U) such that:
(a) Some model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 with D countable satisfies ϕ.
(b) No model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 with D uncountable satisfies ϕ.
Proof: Basically, ϕ says that ≺ is a lexicographical order on D ×D; such an order cannot
be embedded in 〈ℜ, <〉 if D is uncountable. For typographical simplicity, we choose X ∈ U,
and write ≺ in place of ≺X .
Specifically, we take ϕ to be the conjunction of the following formulas.
(16) (a) ∀x∀y(x 6= y → ((Gxx ≺ Gyy) ∨ (Gyy ≺ Gxx))
(b) ∀x1y1x2y2((Gx1y1 ≺ Gx2y2) ↔ ((Gx1x1 ≺ Gx2x2) ∨ ((x1 = x2) ∧ (Gy1y1 ≺
Gy2y2))))
Let a model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 and w0 ∈W be given with w0 ∈ ϕ[M ]. We define:
X = {u(s(w0, Gxx[M, d(a/x) ])) | a ∈ D}.
Then (16)a implies that X (a set of reals) has the same cardinality as D. Define:
Y = {u(s(w0, Gxy[M, d(a/x, b/y) ])) | a, b ∈ D}.
Then (16)b implies that 〈Y,<〉 is isomorphic to the lexicographic ordering of X ×X.
We leave to the reader the verification that ϕ is satisfiable in a model with countable do-
main. On the other hand, suppose that the domain is uncountable, whence X is uncountable.
Then the existence of an isomorphism between 〈Y,<〉 and the lexicographic ordering of X×X
contradicts the separability of the real line. ✷
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4.4 Preorder models
We can recover the upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property by introducing a more general way
to compare the value of worlds. Recall that a (total) preorder is transitive, connected, and
reflexive over its domain. Given a signature (L,U), we achieve more generality by replacing
u in a model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 with a map ☎ from U to the set of preorders over W. [We write
☎X for ☎(X), X ∈ U.] In such a model 〈D,W, t,☎, s〉, we evaluate (θ X ψ) according to
the following rule, in place of (4)e.
(4)e′ If ϕ has the form (θ X ψ) for X ∈ U, then ϕ[M, d ] = ∅ if either θ[M, d ] =
∅ or ψ[M, d ] = ∅. Otherwise:
ϕ[M, d ] = {w ∈W | s(w, θ[M, d ]) ☎X s(w,ψ[M, d ])}.
In what follows, we’ll call the semantics based on (4)e′ preorder logic. The original semantics,
based on (4)e, will be called utility logic. It is easy to see that utility logic is a special case of
preorder logic (since assigning utilities to worlds preorders them). Also, it is straightforward
to show that the formula ϕ in the proof of Proposition (15) is satisfied in a preorder model
with uncountable domain D. Indeed, the following Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem holds for
preorder models.
(17) Proposition: Let 〈D,W, t,☎, s〉 be a preorder model for a countable signature.
(a) If W is infinite, then for every infinite cardinal κ there is a preorder model
M′ = 〈D′,W′, t′,☎′, s′〉 such that card(W′) = κ and for every sentence ϕ,
M |= ϕ if and only if M′ |= ϕ.
(b) If D is infinite, then for every infinite cardinal κ there is a preorder modelM′ =
〈D′,W′, t′,☎′, s′〉 such that card(D′) = κ and for every sentence ϕ,
M |= ϕ if and only if M′ |= ϕ.
Despite the greater generality of preorder logic, and the contrast between Propositions (17)
and (15), the distinction between utility and preorder models is not discernible by formulas.
Indeed:
(18) Proposition: A formula θ is valid in the class of utility models if and only if it is
valid in the class of preorder models.
Finally, the next proposition shows that the set of formulas which are valid in preorder models
(and hence utility models, by the preceding proposition) is axiomatizable. We assume that
the signature is effectively enumerable.
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(19) Proposition: The set of formulas which are valid in preorder models is effectively
enumerable.
Proofs of Propositions (17), (18), and (19) are given in the Appendix.
4.5 Generalized preference logic
Reliance on utilities to express preference has a long history in economics e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). Proposition (18) provides some justification for this approach inasmuch as the more
general preorder logic does not change the class of validities, compared to utility logic. Indeed,
validity is preserved in utility logic even if the range of u is limited to the rationals (since
every countable preorder is isomorphic to the natural ordering of a subset of rationals).
A yet more general logic is presented in Osherson and Weinstein (2012). We call a quadru-
ple 〈D,W, t, r〉 a generalized model for signature (L,U) if D, W, and t are as before, and r is a
mapping from W×U to the set of preorders over nonempty propositions (nonempty subsets of
W). The selection function s no longer appears since propositions are now compared directly
rather than via representative worlds chosen by s. In this kind of model we evaluate (θ X ψ)
according to the following variant of (4)e.
(4)e′′ If ϕ has the form (θ X ψ) for X ∈ U, then ϕ[M, d ] = ∅ if either θ[M, d ] =
∅ or ψ[M, d ] = ∅. Otherwise:
ϕ[M, d ] = {w ∈W | θ[M, d ] comes no earlier than ψ[M, d ] in r(w,X)}.
In Osherson and Weinstein (2012) we analyze the relation between generalized models and
utility models in the sentential context. For quantified preference logic, matters are less clear
and we leave the following question open.
(20) Open Question: Are the set of formulas valid in utility models the same as the
formulas valid in generalized models?
An affirmative answer would provide further evidence for the sufficiency of the utility approach
to preference. Of course, validity might be preserved between logics when all their models
are considered but break down if attention is limited to certain subsets. The next section
illustrates subsets of models that are defined by natural properties. For the remainder of the
discussion, only utility models (introduced in Section 3) are at issue.
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5 Subclasses of utility models
5.1 Metricity
Many interesting properties of a model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 can formulated just in terms of W and
s (the model’s “frame”). For example, Osherson and Weinstein (2012) consider the following
way to express the idea that s chooses “the nearest world.”
(21) Definition: A model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 is metric just in case there is a metric d : W ×
W → ℜ such that for all w ∈ W and ∅ 6= A ⊆ W, s(w,A) is the unique d-closest
member of A to w.
Note that a model is metric only if d-closest worlds exist (there are no chains of worlds ever d-
closer to a given world). It is easy to see that in a metric model the set of worlds is countable.
There are several properties of models that are implied by metricity. Here we focus on:
(22) Definition: A model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 is transitive just in case for all A,B,C ⊆ W
with A,B 6= ∅, and w0 ∈ W, if s(w0, A ∪ B) ∈ A and s(w0, B ∪ C) ∈ B then
s(w0, A ∪ C) = s(w0, A ∪B).
Exploiting our quantificational apparatus, we can write a formula that is true in all transitive
models but not valid. We assume that the signature includes the predicate P . For notational
ease, we suppress the X on ≈X .
(23) Proposition: Let ϕ be the conjunction of the following formulas.
(a) ∀xy(x 6= y → (Px 6≈ Py))
(b) ∀xyz ((x 6= y ∧ y 6= z ∧ x 6= z) → ((((Px ∨ Py) ≈ Px) ∧ ((Py ∨ Pz) ≈ Py)) →
(Px ∨ Pz) ≈ Px))
Then ϕ is invalid but valid in the class of transitive models.
The proposition can be viewed as expressing the transitivity of revealed preference, e.g.,
(Px ∨ Py) ≈ Px says that Px is chosen from the mutually exclusive options Px, Py.
Proof: Let model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉, w0 ∈ W and assignment d be given. Let
Px[M, d ] = A, Py[M, d ] = B and Pz[M, d ] = C. If any of d(x), d(y), d(z) are identical or
either A or B are empty then we are done. Otherwise, in the presence of (23)a, (Px∨Py) ≈ Px
and (Py∨Pz) ≈ Py imply respectively that s(w0, A∪B) ∈ A and s(w0, B∪C) ∈ B. So tran-
sitivity implies s(w0, A∪C) = s(w0, A∪B) which entails w0 ∈ (Px∨Pz) ≈ (Px∨Py)[M, d ].
So the proposition follows by the transitivity of ≈ from w0 ∈ (Px ∨ Py) ≈ Px[M, d ]. ✷
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5.2 Beyond the frame
Rational agents might not be able to discriminate between isomorphic worlds. To formulate
this idea, fix a signature (L,U), and let model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 be given. We say that
v,w ∈W are isomorphic (v ≃ w) just in case there is a permutation h of D such that for all
Q ∈ L, h (applied component-wise) maps t(v,Q) onto t(w,Q).
(24) Definition: Model 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 is utility-invariant just in case for all isomorphic
v,w ∈W, uX(v) = uX(w) for all X ∈ U.
This is not a frame property because all components of the model are involved in its for-
mulation. Validity in the utility-invariant models doesn’t imply validity in the strict sense.
Indeed, we have:
(25) Proposition: Let signature (L,U) be given with L finite, and distinct X,Y ∈ U.
Then there is invalid ϕ ∈ L(L,U) that is valid in the class of utility-invariant models.
Proof: There is χ ∈ L(L,U) such that for all models M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉, χ[M ] = W iff
| D | = 2. Hence, by the finitude of L and the presence of identity, there is closed, satisfiable
ψ ∈ L(L,U) such that for all models M, if w1, w2 ∈ ψ[M ] then w1 ≃ w2. Let the promised
ϕ be:
(ψ ∧ (ψ ≻X ⊤) ∧ (ψ ≻Y ⊤))→ ((ψ ∧ (ψ ≻X ⊤)) ≈X (ψ ∧ (ψ ≻Y ⊤))).
We indicate why ϕ is invalid. The antecedent of ϕ is easily seen to be satisfiable, and a
ψ-world satisfying ψ ∧ (ψ ≻X ⊤) need not be the same world that satisfies ψ ∧ (ψ ≻Y ⊤));
and uX may be chosen to be injective.
On the other hand, suppose that model M = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 is utility-invariant and let
w0 ∈W. Suppose that the antecedent of ϕ is satisfiable inM (otherwise, we are done). Then
(ψ∧(ψ ≻X ⊤)[M ] 6= ∅ and (ψ∧(ψ ≻Y ⊤))[M ] 6= ∅. So, let w1 = s(w0, (ψ∧(ψ ≻X ⊤))[M ])
and w2 = s(w0, ψ ∧ (ψ ≻Y ⊤)))[M ]). Then each of w1, w2 satisfies ψ so w1 ≃ w2. Hence
uX(w1) = uX(w2) by utility-invariance. ✷
6 Anonymity
Our final topic concerns the manner in which utilities are associated with formulas. First, a
condition is exhibited that makes the utility of a conjunction depend on just the utilities of
each conjunct separately. For example, according to this condition the vocabulary appearing
in a conjunct is not permitted to influence the utility of the conjunction; rather, the conjunct
contributes its utility “anonymously.” A second condition is then introduced that entails a
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similar kind of anonymity for the contribution of utility indexes 1 and 2 to the aggregated
utility {1, 2}. The material in this section is inspired by the discussion in Krantz et al. (1971,
§7.2).
6.1 Decomposing the utility of conjunctions
Let a signature (L,U) be given with predicate P ∈ L. Conjunctive anonymity with respect
to P is expressed by the following formula. (To lighten notation, we suppress X ∈ U in
subscripts.)
(26) ϕ
def
= ∀xy((Px ≈ Py)→ ∀z((Px ∧ Pz) ≈ (Py ∧ Pz)))
The next proposition gives the sense in which ϕ causes the utility of Px∧Py to be a function
(F ) of the utilities of Px and Py.
(27) Proposition: Let modelM = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 be given with w0 ∈ ϕ[M ]. Then there
is a function F : ℜ2 → ℜ such that for all assignments d with Px ∧ Py[M, d ] 6= ∅,
u(s(w0, Px ∧ Py[M, d ])) = F (u(s(w0, Px[M, d ])), u(s(w0, Py[M, d ])) ).
Proof: For numbers of the form u(s(w0, Px[M, d ])) and u(s(w0, Py[M, d ])) define:
(28) F (u(s(w0, Px[M, d ])), u(s(w0, Py[M, d ])) )
def
= u(s(w0, Px ∧ Py[M, d ])).
For all other numbers r1, r2, F (r1, r2) is defined arbitrarily. We must show that F is a
function. For this purpose, let variable q be given, and suppose that
(29) u(s(w0, Px[M, d ])) = u(s(w0, P q[M, d ])).
To finish the proof it suffices to show that
(30) u(s(w0, Px ∧ Py[M, d ])) = u(s(w0, P q ∧ Py[M, d ])),
the second argument of F being treated in the same way. It follows immediately from (29)
that w0 ∈ (Px ≈ Pq)[M, d ], hence by (26)
w0 ∈ ((Px ∧ Py) ≈ (Pq ∧ Py))[M, d ],
which implies (30). ✷
Observe that ϕ and Proposition (27) can be formulated with disjunction in place of con-
junction — or with many other formulas. The proof proceeds in the same way.
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6.2 Decomposing a complex utility index
Suppose for this section that the signature (L,U) contains unary P ∈ L along with {1}, {2}, {1, 2} ∈
U. Define:
(31) ϕ
def
= ∀xy( ((Px ≈1 Py) ∧ (Px ≈2 Py))→ (Px ≈1,2 Py) ).
Then ϕ implies that the contributions of 1 and 2 to the complex utility index {1, 2} can be
separated then brought back together via a binary mapping on ℜ. Specifically:
(32) Proposition: Let modelM = 〈D,W, t, u, s〉 be given with w0 ∈ ϕ[M ]. Then there
is a function F : ℜ2 → ℜ such that for all assignments d:
u1,2(s(w0, Px[M, d ])) = F (u1(s(w0, Px[M, d ])), u2(s(w0, Px[M, d ])) ).
Proof: Call a pair (p, q) ∈ ℜ2 critical just in case there is an assignment d such that
(33) (a) p = u1(s(w0, Px[M, d ]))
(b) q = u2(s(w0, Px[M, d ])).
Let F : ℜ2 → ℜ be such that for any critical pair (p, q) as in(33), F (p, q) = u1,2(s(w0, Px[M, d ])).
The behavior of F on noncritical pairs is arbitrary. Suppose that for some assignment d′:
(34) (a) p = u1(s(w0, Px[M, d
′ ]))
(b) q = u2(s(w0, Px[M, d
′ ])).
To verify that F is a function, thereby completing the proof, we must show that
(35) u1,2(s(w0, Px[M, d ])) = u1,2(s(w0, Px[M, d
′ ])).
Let y be a variable distinct from x, and let d′′ = d(d′(x)/y). From (33) and (34) we infer:
w0 ∈ Px ≈1 Py[M, d
′′ ] and w0 ∈ Px ≈2 Py[M, d
′′ ]. From (31) we then obtain w0 ∈
Px ≈1,2 Py[M, d
′′ ] from which (35) is an immediate consequence. ✷
Appendix
We present proofs of Propositions (17), (18), and (19) from Section 4.4. All three proofs elabo-
rate a construction that appears in the demonstration of Theorem (55) in Osherson and Weinstein
(2012). Specifically, the earlier construction can be adapted to show that there is an effective
translation from sentences ϕ ∈ L(L,U) to formulas ϕ†(x) of first-order logic, and a map from
preorder models M = 〈D,W, t,☎, s〉 to relational structures FM such that
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(36) w ∈ ϕ[M] iff FM |= ϕ
†[w].
Moreover, assuming that (L,U) is recursive, there is a recursively axiomatizable first-order
theory T in the signature of FM such that
(37) for every preorder model M, FM |= T
and
(38) for every first-order structure A, if A |= T , then for some preorder modelM, A = FM.
Proposition (19) now follows from the completeness theorem for first-order logic, since (36),
(37), and (38) imply that ϕ ∈ L(L,U) is valid in preorder logic if and only if ∀xϕ†(x)
is a consequence of T . In like fashion, Proposition (17) follows from the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
Theorem for first-order logic. Proposition (18) now follows immediately, since every countable
preorder model is induced by a corresponding utility model, a consequence of the fact that
the rational numbers are universal among countable linear orders. ✷
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